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Children learn actions performed by a social partner better when they misremember these actions as their
own. Identifying the factors that alter the propensity to make appropriation errors is critical for optimizing
social learning. In two experiments (N = 110), we investigate the developmental trajectory of appropriation
errors and examine social-cognitive and motor-related factors in 3- to 8-year-olds. Children with better theory
of mind (ToM) skills made fewer appropriation errors for motorically complex actions. Appropriation errors
did not differ as a function of ToM if children could perform the corresponding actions. A second experiment
replicated this effect and found no influence of collaborative context on appropriation errors. This research
sheds light on the complex relations among development, social-cognition, and motor-related factors.
One of the most prominent ways for children to
gain new knowledge is through their interactions
with and observations of other individuals. In addi-
tion to formal learning contexts such as schooling,
informal interactions with social partners are sys-
tematic and incredibly rich sources of information
in the everyday lives of young children. When
interacting with a parent, for example, young chil-
dren can learn about the function of different
objects and tools, about the actions that are neces-
sary to achieve certain goals, and about the lan-
guage used to label objects and events (Woodward,
Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson, & Buresh, 2009).
The evidence that children begin learning from
these interactions as early as infancy is plentiful
(e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2011).
From a young age, infants are prone to copy the
actions they see performed by another person
(Meltzoff, 2007). Imitative learning in infancy is
often tested in the context of memory for actions, as
in Bauer’s seminal delayed imitation tasks (e.g.,
Lukowski et al., 2005). This kind of imitative
learning is a precursor to more complex and collab-
orative interactions with social partners. In the third
year, children begin to engage in increasingly com-
plex social interactions that include coordinating
complementary actions over time to achieve a com-
mon goal with a social partner (Endedijk et al.,
2015; Meyer, Bekkering, Paulus, & Hunnius, 2010).
During joint actions, children’s learning about how
to perform the actions or achieve a joint goal is
dependent upon memory for the actions produced
by both themselves and their social partner. In
addition to remembering how to produce actions,
accurate memory for these events involves recalling
the source of each action: who performed which
role. This could be important, for example, if chil-
dren recognize that they need a partner to help
them to carry out a particular step of an action that
they cannot do themselves.
Memory for Actions: The Appropriation Error
In previous research examining children’s mem-
ory for actions carried out in social contexts, a curi-
ous two-fold effect has been found. As expected,
children form memories of the actions carried out
during social interactions such that they can recall
and perform many of the actions performed by
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both themselves and their social partner (Som-
merville & Hammond, 2007). Interestingly, how-
ever, children show a systematic bias in the errors
they make regarding the source of the actions. That
is, when asked who performed which action, chil-
dren tend to take credit for the actions of their part-
ner more often than they misremember actions
carried out by themselves as completed by their
partner (Foley, Passalacqua, & Ratner, 1993; Foley
& Ratner, 1998).
Even though this appropriation bias is termed an
error, evidence indicates that these kinds of errors
can actually lead to better learning about how to
perform the actions carried out by a partner. For
example, in Sommerville and Hammond (2007),
children were more likely to accurately recall how
to perform the actions originally performed by a
social partner if they mistakenly thought they had
carried out those actions themselves. Despite its
role in learning new actions, evidence about the
developmental trajectory of this error and the
mechanisms underlying its occurrence is scarce. The
aim of this research is to begin filling the current
gap in research by addressing the developmental
trajectory of this error and how it is influenced by
social-cognitive skills like theory of mind (ToM)
and motor-related factors like the motoric complex-
ity of the social partner’s action.
Developmental Change in the Appropriation Error
In early work on the appropriation error, Foley,
Ratner, and colleagues (Foley et al., 1993) found
that 4-year-olds were more likely to systematically
make appropriation errors than 6- or 8-year-olds.
The authors of this work noted, however, that the
developmental effect in this research could have
been a function of the difficulty of the particular
task used (i.e., that the error rates may have varied
by age as a function of task difficulty rather than as
a function of changes in the propensity to make
appropriation errors). This suggests that whether
and how these errors change across developmental
time is still an open question. More recent research
(Hala, Brown, McKay, & San Juan, 2013; Hala,
McKay, Brown, & San Juan, 2016) has found appro-
priation errors in children as young as 2.5 years.
This calls for systematic research into how they
change over development. In order to provide a
comprehensive developmental assessment of how
the propensity to make these errors changes across
development, we use a task suitable for children
across a wide age range and measure age continu-
ously. Using an identical task for participants
between 3 and 8 years of age allows us to test a
conceptual replication of the developmental
changes found by Foley et al. (1993) while control-
ling for general task difficulty.
The Appropriation Error and ToM
Theory of mind refers to the ability to under-
stand one’s own and others’ mental states and dif-
ferentiate between the two. ToM skill is classically
identified by the passing of explicit false belief tasks
and emerges around 4 years of age (Wellman,
Cross, & Watson, 2001, but cf. Baillargeon, Scott, &
He, 2010). Beyond this age, however, higher order
ToM skills continue to emerge. For example,
Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) require identification
of others’ mental states in naturalistic stories that
incorporate complex behavior in social scenarios.
Performance on this task relates to performance on
more standard measures of ToM but continues to
improve into adolescence (Devine & Hughes, 2013).
Given that ToM skills encompass keeping repre-
sentations about oneself and others apart, this skill
set may influence the propensity to commit appro-
priation errors. Specifically, children with better ToM
should be better able to differentiate their own
thoughts, actions, and beliefs from those of another
individual (in this case, a social partner). Therefore,
they might be less likely to merge representations of
their own and others’ actions when recalling actions
carried out in a social context. Previous research has
found that ToM skills influence source monitoring
such that better ToM skills decrease susceptibility to
alternative suggestions when recalling the source of
information (Bright-Paul, Jarrold, & Wright, 2008).
Ford, Lobao, Macaulay, and Herdman (2011) found
more direct support for the effects of ToM on appro-
priation errors in those 4- to 5-year-old children who
had better ToM scores made fewer appropriation
errors than those with lower ToM scores. Whether
such a relation is present throughout early childhood
is unknown. In order to conceptually replicate this
finding with a larger set of participants and explore
the role of individual differences in social- cognition
throughout early childhood, we combine false belief
and Strange Stories tasks to measure ToM of children
in this research in relation to appropriation errors
(between 3 and 8 years of age).
The Appropriation Error and Motoric Complexity
There are many proposed sources of appropria-
tion errors. Sommerville and Hammond (2007)
found that children made more appropriation
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errors following a more collaborative task (with a
shared goal) than a less collaborative task (with dif-
ferent goals for each individual). One proposal for
why children might make more errors following a
shared task is because collaborative tasks require an
individual to tune in to their social partner in order
to predict his or her upcoming actions. In support
of this notion, research has shown that asking par-
ticipants to imagine performing actions leads to an
increase in appropriation errors relative to passive
viewing of the actions (Foley & Johnson, 1985). This
merging of self and other when imagining or pre-
dicting another’s actions could be supported by a
shared neural system. The sensorimotor cortex
responds during both the observation of others’
actions and during the execution of one’s own
actions (Pineda, 2008; Rizzolatti & Fogassi, 2014).
Furthermore, previous work by Meyer, Hunnius,
van Elk, van Ede, & Bekkering (2011) indicated that
the sensorimotor cortex was preferentially engaged
during action observation when 3-year-olds were
involved in an interaction with the person being
observed, relative to when they were observing that
person acting but were not engaged in joint play
with them. Sommerville and Hammond (2007) sug-
gested that such sensorimotor activity during obser-
vation of a partner’s actions may underlie both
appropriation errors and improved learning of the
actions carried out by a social partner.
If sensorimotor activity does play a role in appro-
priation errors, then factors that alter the degree to
which the system is engaged (motor-related factors)
should influence the occurrence of appropriation
errors. For example, sensorimotor activity is signifi-
cantly influenced by motoric experience such that
there is more activity when an individual observes
actions he or she has previously produced than when
he or she observes unfamiliar actions which are not
in the observer’s motor repertoire (Calvo-Merino,
Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Ger-
son, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015; Gerson, Meyer,
Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2017). In the current research,
we test the hypothesis that appropriation errors are
more likely to occur for actions that are motorically
simple (i.e., within a child’s motor repertoire) relative
to actions that are motorically complex (i.e., outside
the child’s motor repertoire).
Potential Interactions Between ToM and Motoric
Complexity
Importantly, and beyond the scope of previous
investigations, this integrative approach allows us
to look at whether individual differences in social
cognition interact with or are independent of poten-
tial effects of motor complexity. One possibility is
that ToM skills and motoric complexity play inde-
pendent roles (i.e., each produce main effects). An
alternative possibility is that children’s social-cogni-
tive and motoric skills interact in relation to making
appropriation errors. For instance, those with better
ToM skills may be better able to distinguish which
actions are motorically simple versus complex for
oneself versus another because of a better sense of
self (Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006; Sodian,
Hülsken, & Thoermer, 2003) and, thus, a better
grasp of one’s own action capabilities. If this were
true, children with better ToM skills would be less
likely to make appropriation errors for actions that
they know they cannot perform themselves (i.e.,
motorically complex actions) than for actions they
know they can perform (i.e., motorically simple
actions). Consequently, this approach has the poten-
tial to unravel putative multifaceted roles of differ-
ent factors on the propensity to perform
appropriation errors in early childhood.
The Current Research
In the current study, we systematically investi-
gated three potential contributors to children’s
propensity to make appropriation errors: age, social
cognition (ToM skills), and motor-related factors
(motoric complexity of actions). Children between 3
and 8 years of age participated in a social interac-
tion with an experimenter in which they took turns
performing actions (cued by photographs of the
action outcome) to achieve a shared goal. The
actions the child produced were chosen to be feasi-
ble for all children participating so that we could
ensure they could accurately state that they per-
formed the action themselves. The actions per-
formed by the experimenter, however, varied in
terms of whether we expected children to have the
motor capacity to perform them. That is, although
some actions were defined as motorically simple, in
that we expected most children to be able to per-
form them without a struggle (e.g., velcroing a
strap in place), we assumed that other, motorically
complex, actions would be outside the motor reper-
toire of the majority of children in the sample (e.g.,
tying shoelaces). Following the social interaction,
children engaged in a short (about 3 min) assess-
ment to measure ToM. Children then saw the same
photos that were used to prime each action during
the shared task and were asked who had previ-
ously performed each action. For each action previ-
ously performed by the child, the child could either
Memory for Social Actions in Children 3
correctly label it as self-performed or mistakenly
label it as performed by the experimenter (You Did
It error). For the actions previously performed by
the experimenter, the child could correctly label it
as experimenter performed or commit an appropri-
ation error such that he or she mislabeled it as self-
performed (I Did It error). Across ages, we could
then assess whether appropriation errors were con-
sistently more common than source errors for one’s
own actions, as expected from previous research
(Foley & Ratner, 1998; Foley et al., 1993; Som-
merville & Hammond, 2007). ToM assessments
were conducted to examine whether children who
performed better at ToM tasks would make fewer
appropriation errors. Varying the motor complexity
of the experimenter’s actions allowed us to assess
whether appropriation errors were more likely for
(simple) actions within the motor repertoire of chil-
dren than for (complex) actions outside their motor
repertoire, while controlling for age differences. We
also assessed potential relations between individual
differences in ToM and motoric complexity on chil-
dren’s propensity to commit appropriation errors.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Fifty-three children (24 males) between 3 and
8 years were included in the final sample (Mage =
5.51 years [SEM = .15]). An additional six children
participated but were not included in final analyses
due to being over 8 years of age (n = 2), missing
birth date information (n = 1), or missing video
recording necessary for coding (n = 3). Children
were recruited at a science centre in Dundee, Scot-
land and a zoo in Edinburgh, Scotland and were
tested in these settings that same day. Although
specific demographic information was not collected,
both Dundee and Edinburgh have largely Caucasian
populations (94% and 91.7% white according to 2011
Census; http://www.ons.gov.uk/census, http://
www.scotlandcensus.gov.uk). Entry fees to these
sites range from £6.50 to £19.95. Parents or guardians
of children completed written informed consent and
children gave verbal assent. All research was
approved for the project ‘Did I Do That? Influences
of Social Interactions on Memory and Action Learn-
ing’ by the local ethics committee at Cardiff Univer-
sity (Blinded for review; approval EC16.06.14.53).
Children received a sticker for participating.
Materials
The stimuli used in this experiment included a
variety of toys that afforded a range of actions (see
Figure 1 for a list of actions). For about a third of
the actions, a “dress up pirate” doll that is made
for children to practice different dressing skills was
used. The pirate afforded, for example, buttoning a
pocket, zipping a shoe, tying a shoe, and velcroing
a strap in place. Other actions involved beads,
strings, a bending dinosaur toy, novel tools, and a
medicine box. For each of the 18 actions, a pho-
tograph depicting the end state of the action was
presented as a cue to the action during both the
turn-taking game and the recall phase (see Fig-
ure 1). The four phases of each experimental session
were recorded using a video camera with a profile
view of the child and the child’s behavior.
Procedure
Phase 1: Turn-taking game. All children partici-
pated in a turn-taking game with the experimenter
in which they took turns carrying out actions in
order to achieve a joint goal (i.e., helping a pirate
prepare and keep his treasure safe). Each action
was depicted in a photograph and the photographs
were presented sequentially, one at a time. The
child and the experimenter each carried out nine
actions in alternation and the experimenter said
they were working together to prepare the pirate
and his treasure. The experimenter began by point-
ing at the first photograph and saying “I’m going
to make it look like this. (Perform action) See?
Look. I made it look like the picture.” She then
turned the page to reveal the next action and said,
“Now it’s your turn. Can you make it look like
that?” The experimenter and child took turns per-
forming the 18 actions.
The actions carried out by the child were all
designed to be possible for all children to carry out
without assistance. If the child did not respond to
the initial action prompt, the experimenter would
repeat the prompt and ensure the child’s attention
was directed towards the photograph. If necessary,
the experimenter also pointed toward the object the
child could use. If the child was struggling to per-
form the action, the experimenter would again
draw their attention to the relevant objects and
mimic how the action could be completed. The
child was allowed to carry out the action in any
way he or she chose as long as the child reached
the goal indicated in the picture. In this way, the
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child achieved a sense that he or she had success-
fully carried out each of his or her nine actions.
In order to ensure that the experimenter’s actions
differed in terms of motoric complexity in this age
range, a separate group of 3- to 8-year-old children
(n = 65; Mage = 5.91 years [SEM = .16]) engaged in
a difficulty assessment task in which they
attempted to reconstruct each action after viewing
Figure 1. The photos shown to children to depict each of the experimenter and child’s actions as carried out in Experiment 1 are listed
and described. For the actions carried out by the experimenter, the actual rates of success and rated complexity of each action, as found
in the difficulty assessment, are noted. In the bottom right corner, the order in which each of the experimenter’s and child’s actions
were carried out is noted (e.g., the experimenter’s first action was moving the bead with the yellow tool and her ninth action was plac-
ing the bandana on the box).
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it performed by an experimenter. These children
were recruited and tested at a science centre in Car-
diff, Wales. According to a UK census, Cardiff is
84.7% White (info is from Census data collected in
2011, http://www.ons.gov.uk/census). Children
were at ceiling in performing three of the nine
actions. In contrast, the remaining six actions varied
in the percentage of children who could perform
them without assistance. Figure 1 depicts the range
of actions in order of increasing complexity accord-
ing to this separate group of children. During this
difficulty assessment, children were only coded as
successful if they could carry out the action in the
manner demonstrated by the experimenter and did
not get credit, for example, for moving the orange
tool and the bead to the pocket independently with
his or her fingers (experimenter Action 2 in Fig-
ure 1). This figure also shows the cut-offs for those
actions defined as simple or complex, as defined in
analyses below.
Phase 2: ToM assessment. Following the turn-
taking game, children answered four questions
assessing ToM reasoning. The first two questions
were based on the well-established unexpected con-
tents task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). Children
were shown a box of band-aids (plasters) and were
asked what they thought would be inside the box.
After children stated that they expected to see
band-aids, they were shown that, instead, a small
Lego figurine was hidden inside the box. The fig-
urine was returned to the box and then children
were asked the following two questions (in a set
order): (a) “Do you remember what you thought
was inside the box before we opened it?” (b) “If we
asked my friend [name of experimenter not in the
room], and she didn’t see us open it, what would
she think was inside the box?” For both answers,
“band-aids” was considered a correct answer and
“Lego” or “man” was considered an incorrect
answer.
We also included two questions from another
measure of ToM more suitable for older children:
Strange Stories. The stories were taken from exam-
ples used in previous research (Happé, 1994). In the
first story, children were told about a child who
said that a banana was a telephone during pretend
play. They were asked whether it was true what
she said (that the banana was a telephone) and
why this was said. In the second story, a boy did
not pay attention to or thank his mother when she
brought him his meal and the mother sarcastically
called the boy polite. Children were asked whether
it was true what she said (that the boy was polite)
and why she said this. In both cases, the correct
answer was “no” (that the statement was not true).
This implies a basic understanding of pretense and
sarcasm, two high order mental states. The ToM
assessment typically took approximately 3 min.
For all tasks, the experimenter repeated the
child’s response aloud to ensure it was audible on
the video recording. All four ToM tasks were coded
via video offline by a trained researcher who
assigned the child a 1 for each correct answer and a
0 for no answer or incorrect answers. Children’s
first response was taken as their answer even if
they later changed their answer. The proportion of
correct answers (out of four) was calculated for
each participant.
Phase 3: Recall. In the recall phase, children
were shown the photographs depicting the actions
carried out in the turn-taking game (the same pho-
tos previously used to prompt the action) and
were asked to recall who had completed each
action (the experimenter or the child). The pho-
tographs were shown in one of two pseudoran-
dom orders. For each picture, the experimenter
referred to the picture and asked the child if he or
she completed the action or if the experimenter
did so. If the child did not answer, the experi-
menter reminded the child that it was okay to
guess. The experimenter then repeated the child’s
answer to ensure that it was audible on video.
Approximately 25% of videos were randomly cho-
sen to be reliability coded by a trained coder and
the two coders agreed as to who the child stated
had completed the action on 100% of coded trials
(Cohen’s κ = 1.00).
Phase 4: Reconstruction. Finally, children had
the option to participate in a reconstruction phase;
this phase was optional given the time constraints
of testing in a public setting. Due to the smaller
sample size (N = 38) and the departure from the
main aims of the current research, we do not dis-
cuss or analyze this data in the present report but
include it here for transparency.
Results
Because children performed nine actions and the
experimenter performed nine actions, children
could commit between zero and nine I Did It errors
(claiming they performed an action the experi-
menter had performed) and between zero and nine
You Did It errors (claiming the experimenter per-
formed an action the child had performed). For
each child, we calculated the proportion of trials for
which the child committed each type of error such
that the number of I Did It errors was divided by
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nine and the number of You Did It errors was
divided by nine.
In order to investigate the role of motoric com-
plexity, we also separately calculated I Did It errors
for motorically Simple and motorically Complex
actions. The number of I Did It errors made on the
three actions rated as motorically Simple (see Fig-
ure 1) was divided by 3 to create an I Did It Simple
errors proportion score. The number of I Did It
errors made on the three actions rated as motori-
cally Complex (see Figure 1) was divided by 3 to
create an I Did It Complex errors proportion score.
The three actions that fell in the middle of the com-
plexity scale were left out of this analysis to focus
on the more extreme actions on each end of the
scale.
Given the non-normal distribution of proportion
scores, all proportion scores were arcsine trans-
formed (two times the arcsine of the square root of
the proportion) before being entered into analyses.
Group Differences in Errors
As an initial test of whether we replicated the
general effect of appropriation errors such that chil-
dren made more I Did It than You Did It errors, we
conducted a paired samples t-test comparing trans-
formed proportion scores for each of these error
types. Across children of all ages, we replicated this
effect, t(52) = −2.73, p = .009, Cohen’s d = .59, with
children performing I Did It errors (nontransformed
M = .13, SEM = .01) more often than You Did It
errors (nontransformed M = .06, SEM = .08).
Effects of Age, ToM Skills, Condition, and Motoric
Complexity on Appropriation Errors
We then conducted a Repeated Measures analy-
sis of covariance (ANCOVA) to examine the poten-
tial roles of age and ToM on the different kinds of
errors described above. The within-subjects factor
was type of errors (3: I Did It Simple, I Did It Com-
plex, You Did It). ToM score was entered as a
between-subjects factor. Age was entered as a
covariate. One participant was not included in this
analysis because they did not complete all of the
ToM tasks. This analysis revealed a significant main
effect of age, F(1, 47) = 10.59, p = .002, η2p = .18,
such that younger children made more errors over-
all than older children. A significant interaction
between error type and ToM score, F(6, 96) = 2.87,
p = .013, η2p = .16, also emerged. No other main
effects or interactions were significant (Fs < 1.70,
ps > .19).
Interaction: ToM Skills by Motoric Complexity
In order to follow-up on the error type by ToM
score interaction and to better understand how
individual differences contribute to different types
of errors, we conducted separate regressions for
each error type. For each regression, transformed
error proportion scores were entered as the depen-
dent variable (in three separate regressions: I Did It
Simple, I Did It Complex, You Did It), age was added
as a predictor in the first step, and ToM score was
added to the model as a predictor in the second
step.
For I Did It Simple errors, the regression that only
included age as a predictor provided the best fit
(see Table 1). The model that included both age
and ToM score did not significantly improve the
model. Age was a significant predictor of errors,
but ToM score was not. As age increased, propor-
tion of I Did It Simple errors decreased. For I Did It
Complex errors, the regression that only included
age was marginally significant (see Table 1). The
model that added ToM scores as a predictor pro-
vided a better fit. Age and ToM score were both
significant predictors of errors. Older children and
children with better ToM scores made fewer I Did
It Complex errors. For You Did It errors, neither
regression was significant (see Table 1). Neither age
nor ToM scores were significant predictors.
Discussion
The results both conceptually replicate and
extend previous research concerning the develop-
mental trajectory and distinct social-cognitive and
action-related factors affecting the appropriation
error. Consistent with prior research, we found that
children make more I Did It than You Did It errors
when recalling actions carried out in a social con-
text (Foley & Ratner, 1998; Foley et al., 1993). This
was true for a wider age range than previously
tested (between 3 and 8 years).
Building upon this initial finding, we investi-
gated three factors that might alter rates of I Did It
errors: ToM skills, motor complexity, and age. We
found a main effect of age such that errors
decreased as children got older and a significant
interaction between ToM and error type that indi-
cated that the effects of ToM differed for different
levels of motoric complexity. Regressions indicated
that I Did It errors for both motorically simple and
complex actions decreased across age, consistent
with prior research (Foley et al., 1993). While it is
unsurprising that older children make fewer
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Table 1
Regressions by Error Type
Dependent variable Predictor b b 95% CI [LL, UL] β t Fit Difference
Experiment 1
Motorically simple (intercept) 1.56 [0.63, 2.50] 3.37*
Age −0.18 [−0.35, −0.019] −.3 −2.23*
R2 = .091*
(intercept) 1.88 [0.76, 2.99] 3.37*
Age −0.19 [−0.35, −0.02] −.3 −2.26*
Theory-of-mind (ToM) score −0.39 [−1.15, 0.38] −.14 −1.01
R2 = .11* Change in R2 = .019
Motorically complex (intercept) 1.19 [0.34, 2.05] 2.79*
Age −0.15 [−0.30, 0.003] −.27 −1.97^
R2 = .07^
(intercept) 1.76 [0.76, 2.76] 3.55*
Age −0.15 [−0.30, −0.005] −.27 −2.08*
ToM score −0.71 [−1.39, −0.022] −.27 −2.07*
R2 = .15* Change in R2 = .075*
You Did It errors (intercept) 0.76 [0.21, 1.31] 2.80*
Age −0.079 [−0.18, 0.018] −.23 −1.64
R2 = .051
(intercept) 0.55 [−0.10, 1.20] 1.69^
Age −0.078 [−0.18, 0.019] −.22 −1.62
ToM score 0.26 [−0.19, 0.71] .16 1.18
R2 = .077 Change in R2 = .026
Experiment 2
Motorically simple (intercept) 1.33 [0.54, 2.13] 3.36*
Age −0.19 [−0.34, −0.039] −.32 −2.5*
R2 = .10*
(intercept) 1.4 [0.60, 2.21] 3.48*
Age −0.16 [−0.32, −0.004] −.28 −2.05*
ToM score −0.3 [−0.89, 0.29] −.14 −1.03
R2 = .12* Change in R2 = .017
Motorically complex (intercept) 1.69 [0.83, 2.56] 3.93*
Age −0.25 [−0.41, −0.088] −.38 −3.088*
R2 = .15*
(intercept) 1.91 [1.10, 2.72] 4.73*
Age −0.17 [−0.32, −0.007] −.26 −2.099*
ToM score −0.94 [−1.53, −0.36] −.39 −3.22*
R2 = .28* Change in R2 = .14*
You Did It errors (intercept) 0.24 [−0.17, 0.65] 1.17
Age −0.016 [−0.094, 0.061] −.057 −0.42
R2 = .003
(intercept) 0.24 [−0.18, 0.66] 1.12
Age −0.018 [−0.10, 0.065] −.062 −0.43
ToM score 0.019 [−0.29, 0.32] .018 0.12
R2 = .003 Change in R2 < .001
Motorically simple
(five actions)
(intercept) 1.76 [1.015, 2.50] 4.74*
Age −0.25 [−0.39, −0.11] −.44 −3.58*
R2 = .19*
(intercept) 1.8 [1.04, 2.56] 4.75*
Age −0.24 [−0.38, −0.086] −.41 −3.16*
ToM score −0.17 [−0.72, 0.38] −.079 −0.61
R2 = .20* Change in R2 = .006
*p < .05, ^p < .10.
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memory errors than younger children, we also see
descriptively that the rates of I Did It errors, and
not You Did It errors, seem to change with age.
However, there was no significant age by type of
error interaction.
The interaction between ToM and error type was
driven by the fact that ToM score was related to I
Did It Complex errors but not other error types. This
implies that children with higher ToM abilities were
able to recognize that these actions may be beyond
their motoric capacities and were thus less likely to
mistakenly claim these actions as their own than
children with lower ToM abilities. This is the first
evidence to suggest that ToM plays a role in the
ability to differentiate how one’s own physical
affordances may differ from a social partner’s.
Importantly, the effects of ToM were present even
when controlling for age, suggesting that it is devel-
opment of this particular social cognitive skill,
rather than general maturation, that plays a role.
Building on these results, we conducted a second
experiment with two main aims. Our primary aim
was to replicate the findings from Experiment 1.
Given the wide age range and novelty of the para-
digm, we felt that replicating our findings with a
similar paradigm (varying task-specific aspects that
should not drive findings, as described below) and
using matching analyses techniques would bolster
the conclusions from Experiment 1 (Chambers,
2019; Munafò et al., 2017). As a secondary goal, we
manipulated the degree to which the social interac-
tion was collaborative in order to investigate
whether similar effects of ToM skills and motoric
complexities are found in these different contexts.
As described in the introduction, previous research
has found that more collaborative interactions are
more likely to induce appropriation errors than less
collaborative interactions (Sommerville & Ham-
mond, 2007). Whether this is equally true for chil-
dren high or low in ToM skills and whether this
pattern is specific to motorically simple actions that
are within a child’s motor repertoire are open ques-
tions. It might be that children with lower ToM
skills are especially prone to making appropriation
errors in more collaborative contexts, whereas chil-
dren with higher ToM skills are better able to dis-
tinguish between their own and the other’s mind
state and are thus less affected by the collaborative
context. In terms of the role of motor complexity, it
may be that differences between less and more col-
laborative contexts only emerge for simple, but not
complex, actions. Experiment 2 aims to address
these possibilities.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Fifty-seven children between 3 and 8 years were
included in the final sample, each randomly
assigned to one of two conditions: high collabora-
tive (n = 29, 15 males, Mage = 5.28 years [SEM =
.23]) or low collaborative (n = 28, 13 males, Mage =
5.12 years [SEM = .20]). An additional six children
participated but were not included in final analyses
due to being too old (n = 1), having incomplete
information on their consent form (n = 2), or exper-
imenter error (n = 3). Children were recruited at a
science centre in Dundee, Scotland and a zoo in
Edinburgh, Scotland and were tested in these set-
tings that same day. Although specific demographic
information was not collected, both Dundee and
Edinburgh have largely Caucasian populations
(94% and 91.7% white according to 2011 Census;
http://www.ons.gov.uk/census, http://www.scot
landcensus.gov.uk). Entry fees to these sites range
from £6.50 to £19.95.
Materials
The stimuli used in this experiment were identi-
cal to those used in Experiment 1. The only differ-
ence was that two sets of Pirates and two separate
books of photographs were used in the low collabo-
rative condition.
Procedure
Phase 1: Turn-taking game. As in Experiment 1,
the experimenter and child took turns carrying out
actions. The actions carried out by each individual
were modified slightly from Experiment 1 so as to
ensure that the experimenter and child could each
act on separate objects and in their own spaces in
the low collaboration condition. This also allowed
us to test whether any effects found in Experiment
1 were due to the specific actions carried out by
each individual or a function of a more general
phenomenon. The actions carried out by the child
included five of the actions carried out by the child
in Experiment 1 and the addition of experimenter
Actions 1, 3, 4, and 5 from Figure 1. The actions
carried out by the experimenter included five of the
actions carried out by the experimenter in Experi-
ment 1 and the addition of child Actions 6, 7, 8,
and 9 from Figure 1.
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The high collaboration condition provided a
near replication of Experiment 1. The verbal
prompts and cues given by the experimenter in
Experiment 1 were matched in this experiment
and the child and experimenter took turns carry-
ing out the 18 actions on a shared set of objects in
a shared space. In the low collaboration condition,
the child and experimenter each had a separate
pirate and treasure set. They also had separate
booklets with photographs of the actions to be car-
ried out. The experimenter began by saying,
“We’re going to each get our own pirates and
their different kinds of treasures and we’re going
to take turns getting our pirates ready ⋯ This is
going to be your pirate and I’ve got a different
pirate.” As in Experiment 1 and the high collabo-
ration condition, the experimenter started by per-
forming the first action depicted in her booklet
and saying, “I get to make mine look like this.”
After completing her action, she then drew the
child’s attention to the child’s booklet and asked,
“Can you make yours look like that?” They then
alternated performing actions from each of their
booklets on their separate toys.
The actions carried out by the child were
intended to all be feasible for the child without
assistance. Although two of the actions that chil-
dren were requested to perform in this experiment
were not successfully performed by all children in
the difficulty assessment (see Figure 1), we note
that, as described above for Experiment 1, the
requirements for succeeding during the difficulty
assessment were more arduous than those required
in the turn-taking task (i.e., they had to model the
means of achieving the goal in the difficulty assess-
ment but could emulate the outcome by a different
means and be considered successful in the turn-tak-
ing task). Four of the 57 children needed assistance
with one or two (of nine) actions in Experiment 2
and these children were distributed across the two
conditions.
The motor complexity of the actions carried out
by the experimenter was based on the same diffi-
culty assessment ratings used in Experiment 1.
Children were at ceiling in performing five of the
nine actions carried out by the experimenter (unfold
dino, place dino in box, place beads in box, close
box, seat pirate on box). The remaining four actions
varied in the percentage of children who could
carry them out without assistance, with the three
actions defined as motorically complex matching
the three motorically complex actions defined in
Experiment 1.
Phases 2, 3, and 4
The ToM tasks, recall phase, and reconstruction
phase were all carried out in an identical manner to
Experiment 1 for both conditions in Experiment 2.
They were scored in the same manner as well.
Approximately 25% of recall session videos were
randomly chosen to be reliability coded by a
trained coder and the two coders agreed as to who
the child stated had completed the action on 100%
of coded trials (Cohen’s κ = 1.00). As in Experiment
1, the reconstruction phase was not analyzed.
Results
I Did It and You Did It error proportion scores
were calculated and transformed in the same man-
ner as Experiment 1 before being entered into anal-
yses. The same three actions defined as most
complex in Experiment 1were used to calculate the
proportions of errors for the I Did It Complex condi-
tion. To further closely match calculations of the I
Did It Simple error proportions from Experiment 1,
we chose three of five actions carried out by the
experimenter for which children performed at ceil-
ing levels. Two of the chosen actions were included
in the I Did It Simple calculations from Experiment
1 and the third action was closely matched in terms
of content (placing beads in the box was considered
similar to placing the dino in the box).
For transparency and to ensure that the selection
of these three actions did not bias any results, we
created an additional I Did It Simple error score
including all five actions for which children were at
ceiling level performance. All outcomes are nearly
identical to the three pseudorandomly selected sim-
ple actions. See the bottom of Table 1 for regres-
sions including all five actions in the motorically
simple calculation.
Group Differences in Errors
As an initial test of whether we replicated the
effect of error type and whether this differed by
condition, we conducted a repeated measures anal-
ysis of variance with error type (I Did It vs. You Did
It) as the within-subjects factor and condition as the
between-subjects factor. This revealed a main effect
of error type, F(1, 55) = 20.91, p < .001, η2p = .28,
and no interaction between error type and condi-
tion, F(1, 55) = 0.23, p = .63, η2p = .004, or main
effect of condition, F(1, 55) = 0.08, p = .78,
η2p = .001. We therefore replicated the main effect of
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error type seen in Experiment 1, with children per-
forming more I Did It errors (nontransformed
M = .11, SEM = .02) than You Did It errors (non-
transformed M = .03, SEM = .01).
Effects of Age, ToM Skills, Condition, and Motoric
Complexity on Appropriation Errors
We then conducted a Repeated Measures
ANCOVA to examine the potential roles of ToM,
motor complexity, and age on the different kinds of
errors described above. The within-subjects factor
was type of errors (3: I Did It Simple, I Did It Com-
plex, You Did It). ToM score and condition (high or
low collaboration) were entered as between-subjects
factors. Age was entered as a covariate. This analy-
sis revealed a significant main effect of age, F(1,
46) = 4.31, p = .043, η2p = .086, such that younger
children made more errors than older children. A
significant interaction between error type and ToM
score, F(6.83, 78.54) = 2.21, p = .043, η2p = .16
(greenhouse-geisser corrected for nonsphericity),
also emerged. This replicates the findings of Experi-
ment 1. A marginal main effect of ToM score, F(4,
46) = 2.24, p = .079, η2p = .16, and a marginal inter-
action between condition and ToM score, F(4,
46) = 2.48, p = .057, η2p = .18, also emerged. Because
these were not significant and did not include inter-
actions with error type (our main question of inter-
est), we did not follow up on these marginal
effects. No other main effects or interactions were
marginal or significant (Fs < 1.75, ps > .18).
Interaction: ToM Skills by Motoric Complexity
In order to follow-up on the error type by ToM
score interaction in line with Experiment 1 and to
better understand how individual differences con-
tribute to different types of errors, we conducted
separate regressions for each error type. As in
Experiment 1, for each regression, transformed
error proportion scores were entered as the depen-
dent variable (in three separate regressions: I Did It
Simple, I Did It Complex, You Did It), age was added
as a predictor in the first step, and ToM score was
added to the model as a predictor in the second
step. Given that we found no main effect or interac-
tions with condition, these analyses were collapsed
across conditions (and thus identical to Experiment
1). Outcomes for all errors are consistent with
Experiment 1.
That is, for I Did It Simple errors, the regression
that only included age as a predictor provided the
best fit (see Table 1). The model that included both
age and ToM score did not significantly improve
the model. Age was a significant predictor of errors,
but ToM score was not. As age increased, propor-
tion of I Did It Simple errors decreased. For I Did It
Complex errors, the regression that only included
age was significant (see Table 1). The model that
added ToM scores as a predictor provided a better
fit. Age and ToM score were both significant pre-
dictors of errors. Children with better ToM scores
made fewer I Did It Complex errors and as age
increased, I Did It Complex errors decreased. For
You Did It errors, neither regression was significant
(see Table 1). Neither age nor ToM scores were sig-
nificant predictors of errors.
Discussion
We carried out Experiment 2 with two goals.
The first goal was to provide a near replication of
the findings from Experiment 1 with a new group
of children. The second aim was to investigate
whether modifying the collaborative context of the
social interaction altered the effects seen in Experi-
ment 1. With regards to our first aim, we found a
robust replication of the effects from the first exper-
iment. There was no evidence, however, of a modi-
fication of these findings based on collaborative
context.
The replication of Experiment 1 is important for a
variety of reasons. At a minimum, the replication of
both group effects (i.e., I Did It errors > You Did It
errors) and individual differences (nearly identical
regressions across the two experiments) instils confi-
dence in these novel findings during a time when
replication is sorely needed in science (Chambers,
2019; Munafò et al., 2017). Additionally, the results
replicated even when altering some design factors
that we had no theoretical reason to believe would
be related to the outcomes. In Experiment 2, we
altered about half of the actions that were carried
out by the experimenter versus the child. The fact
that findings remained the same despite this change
implies that the effects are not specific to particular
actions carried out by the experimenter in Experi-
ment 1. An even stronger replication would test a
paradigm using a completely different set of actions
(varying in motoric complexity) in a different labora-
tory. While we encourage this endeavor, it is beyond
the scope of the current research.
At first glance, the lack of effect of collaborative
context seems to contradict previous research indi-
cating that the degree to which the interaction is
social and collaborative alters the propensity to
commit appropriation errors (Sommerville &
Memory for Social Actions in Children 11
Hammond, 2007). Previous research finding an
effect of collaborative context only tested 3- and 4-
year-olds, so one possibility is that the modulation
of appropriation errors based on collaborative con-
text does not apply to the wider age range tested in
the current experiment. An alternative to this possi-
bility, however, is that the methodological approach
taken in the current research played a role.
We note that the methodological differences
between the high and low collaborative conditions
in this experiment were relatively minor in order to
provide strict experimental control. For example,
although the experimenter and child each had their
own set of toys and acted in their own space in the
low collaborative condition, they were both playing
on the same table and coordinated in time. Break-
ing up one’s own set of tasks in order to watch the
experimenter carry out her actions between each
action step may have led the child to believe that
they were playing a game together despite verbal
cues contradicting this and acting on different
objects. It is possible that this general shared spatial
and temporal context provided a cue to the children
that the task was shared. Potentially having the
child carry out his or her set of actions all in one
series before or after watching the experimenter
carry out her set of actions would have better high-
lighted the independence of their tasks (as in Som-
merville & Hammond, 2007). This, however, would
have created a confound of attention and timing
that would make it difficult to interpret any poten-
tial differences between conditions in the current
research. Given these methodological constraints
and the between-subjects nature of the design, it is
difficult to know whether children perceived the
high and low collaborative conditions as differen-
tially social or collaborative. It therefore remains
unclear whether the effects of ToM and motoric
complexity on appropriation errors might still be
modified by more or less social and collaborative
contexts in more extreme contexts.
General Discussion
Together, the current research suggests that chil-
dren commit appropriation errors across early
childhood (3–8 years). The fact that, across both
experiments, appropriation errors decreased across
ages replicates and extends the findings of Foley
et al. (1993), who found that appropriation errors
were more common in 4-year-olds than 6- or 8-
year-olds. The linear effect across a continuous (and
wider) age range further extends this previous
research. Additionally, Foley and colleagues were
concerned that the age effect they found could be
specific to the difficulty of the task they used.
Given that we used a novel task and varied the
actions carried out across our two experiments sug-
gests that this effect of age on appropriation errors
is robust across tasks. The fact that there was no
age- by- error interaction means caution is war-
ranted in the interpretation of this finding.
Importantly, the current research found an inter-
action between ToM skills and motoric complexity,
even when controlling for age. Ford et al. (2011)
previously found that ToM skills were inversely
related to appropriation errors in 4- and 5-year-
olds. The fact that ToM scores were only related to
I Did It Complex, but not I Did It Simple, errors in
our experiments implies that ToM skills are particu-
larly important for ruling out a social partner’s
actions as one’s own when the actions may be
beyond one’s own motor abilities.
In order to successfully identify the actions chil-
dren could not perform themselves, children
needed to recognize that their own motor capacities
might differ from an adult’s (because the adult
always succeeded at performing even the motori-
cally complex actions). Similarly, in order to suc-
ceed in ToM tasks, children need to recognize that
their knowledge state might differ from someone
else’s. Although indirect evidence suggests that sen-
sitivity to different knowledge states and physical
affordances between self and other develops
around the same developmental period as ToM is
improving (e.g., Bennett-Pierre, Asaba, & Gweon,
2018; Bridgers, Altman, & Gweon, 2017; Kim, Pau-
lus, Sodian, & Proust, 2016; Paulus & Moore, 2011),
to our knowledge, no one has addressed whether
ToM and perception of own motoric capacity inter-
act. Our findings with regards to appropriation
errors are the first to suggest an interplay between
these factors.
If, as in previous research (Sommerville & Ham-
mond, 2007), a higher proportion of appropriation
errors relates to better learning about how to per-
form the observed actions, the current findings raise
intriguing questions about how social- cognitive
and motor-related factors might influence social
learning. For example, the current findings might
imply that children with less sophisticated ToM
skills, who mistakenly claim motorically complex
actions as their own, would show improved learn-
ing about the motorically complex observed actions
relative to their peers with more advanced ToM
skills. It seems unlikely that children could learn
how to perform an action outside of their motor
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repertoire simply by mistakenly assuming they had
performed it previously, but if true, it would be an
important learning avenue. It would also raise
questions about whether the benefits of appropria-
tion errors decrease with improved social cognitive
skills. An alternative explanation is that children
with more sophisticated social cognitive skills still
benefit from appropriation errors when observing
actions they could perform on their own, suggest-
ing that they have a refined capacity for social
learning that is adapted for honing into observa-
tional learning at an achievable level. In contrast,
children with less sophisticated social cognitive
skills might waste energy and resources attempting
to recreate actions they do not realize they cannot
perform themselves. Future research should assess
these different possibilities.
One limitation of the present research is that the
assessments of motoric complexity were based on
children of the same age participating in a separate
experiment. Although we would like to know
whether children are more or less likely to make I
Did It errors for actions that vary in terms of their
own, personal motoric capacities, and theoretical
and practical issues prevented us from carrying out
both the social interaction and motoric complexity
ranking with the same children. Theoretical con-
cerns were that if we had assessed children’s moto-
ric abilities prior to participation in the social
interaction, interpretation of the Recall phase would
be challenging because children would have, in
fact, attempted all actions themselves in addition to
watching some being carried out by an experi-
menter. Logistically, the time constraints of testing
in a public setting did not allow us to assess chil-
dren’s motoric abilities after the first three phases.
Our conclusions regarding motor complexity are
thus based on group- level performance rather than
individual motoric skill and it is likely that some of
the complex actions were within the motor reper-
toire of the participating children.
Related to this issue, the interaction between
ToM and motoric complexity would be easier to
interpret if we knew whether children explicitly rec-
ognized actions as within or outside their motor
repertoire. Because we could not ask children about
whether or not they thought they could perform
the actions, we can only assume that fewer errors
for motorically complex actions in the high ToM
children was due to the fact that they were less
likely to take on actions as their own if they recog-
nized them as outside their motor repertoire.
Although alternative explanations for this effect are
possible, this description is both parsimonious and
in line with theoretical assumptions about ToM and
the appropriation error (e.g., Ford et al., 2011).
Future research is needed, however, to both repli-
cate this effect and determine how these interacting
social- cognitive and motor-related factors influence
one another.
Conclusions
Overall, this research implies that children’s
memory for their own and others’ actions continues
to develop into middle childhood and provides
direct evidence that children’s ToM abilities and
motoric abilities interact in their influence on these
memories. It suggests a complex interaction among
social interactions, social cognition, motor develop-
ment, and memory across early childhood (see also
Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Sommerville & Decety,
2006; Thelen & Smith, 1996; Tomasello, 2000). Chil-
dren’s increasing understanding of the self and
others both play a role in decreasing appropriation
errors. Future research is needed to unravel the role
of each of these factors in learning from interactions
with others. For example, when do social cognitive
and motor-related factors facilitate versus inhibit
learning from appropriation errors? Identifying the
developmental dynamics that influence social mem-
ory is a first step in optimizing social learning for
all children.
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